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Arbitration and Fine Dining: Two Faces of Efficiency
William W. Park *
Tout ce qui est excessif devient insignifiant. **
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I.

The Parties’ Legitimate Arbitrations
A. Rival Goals
Aiming to provide fine dining, a restaurant chef will pay attention to several goals, not

all of which marry well one with another. Guests must not wait too long for their meal. Yet
a good dish often takes time to prepare. The wine list should offer quality and choice, but
without being pretentious or overpriced.
Shortcomings in any one area could turn dinner into disappointment. Few points will
be scored if tasty cuisine arrives two hours late, even assuming the customer has not departed
in the interim. Prompt service will rarely save bad food. The evening would be ruined by a
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Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Talleyrand. (“The excessive becomes
insignificant.”)
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chef who had become preoccupied with any single aspect of fine dining, to the exclusion of
the others.
To amplify Talleyrand’s observation, the excessive may become not only
insignificant, but also counterproductive. Too much emphasis on speed can affect food
preparation. An obsession with preparation upsets timely service. Either way, the customer
leaves with a grievance.
Like most analogies, comparisons between arbitration and dining will limp badly.
Few business managers relish a lawsuit in the way they enjoy an evening with friends at a
good restaurant. Yet like dining, arbitral proceedings implicate proportionality and balance
among a multitude of factors which can make the experience better or worse.
As we shall explore in a moment, several elements play key roles in evaluation of any
arbitration: accuracy, fairness, cost and time, and award enforceability. 1 An inevitable
tension exists among these fundamentals. Decisions reached quickly and cheaply will not do
an arbitrator much honor if wrong on the substantive merits. A correct result provides little
satisfaction to a prevailing party if refused recognition because the arbitrators denied due
process or exceeded their jurisdiction.
Many discussions of arbitration focus on efficiency in its slimmest sense, isolating
speed and economy from the other elements necessary for the legitimacy of the process. Time
and cost are portrayed as enemies, rather than trade-offs in the pursuit of a fair process
leading to an accurate and enforceable result.
In this connection, arbitration is often painted as having been infected with poor case
management making the process too much like litigation. Critics say that arbitration has lost
the “quick, cheap and cheerful” tone that made it popular back when commercial men (as

1

For a list of other arbitrator attributes which play into the mix of good (or bad) arbitration,
see Thomas Clay, L’Arbitre est-il un être normal?, in L’EXIGENCE DE JUSTICE: MÉLANGES EN
L’HONNEUR DE ROBERT BADINTER 225 (Dalloz 2016).
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they inevitably were in those days) visited a warehouse to sniff the corn before lunch, then
retired to deliberate with a good bottle of Bordeaux before meeting the parties that afternoon
to scold the seller for failing to deliver “Grade A” grain.
Today however, economic disputes rarely yield themselves to the clarity of oldfashioned grain purchases in an imagined golden age of simple arbitration. Although there
may be some relatively simple questions (analogous to an umpire calling a baseball player
“out” as he slides into home plate), many more will require serious expert testimony on
accounting, legal or engineering matters; they may relate to lost profits, competition ,
taxation, capitalized expenditures, or power plant operation. Controversies may involve
long-term energy supply, bio-technology licenses, and multi-party construction projects.
Dramatically-changed circumstances may be invoked as a defense to contract performance.
Or one side may seek to pierce the corporate veil between a modestly capitalized subsidiary
and its better funded parent.
When international elements infuse arbitration, choice-of-law analysis will often play
a key role in proper decision-making. For such cases, finding the right answer in a fair
fashion may not always be cheap and quick. Unless arbitrators have prejudged the questions
presented to them (hardly a recipe for good proceedings) answering complex questions
usually takes time. 2
To some extent, arbitration has become a victim of its own success, as the arbitral
process moves beyond the simplicity of earlier days, finding acceptance as a commercially
preferred path to decide significant business disputes. Expectations of procedural simplicity
often breed disappointment in the context of adjudicatory reality.

2

One recalls the Latin maxim Veritas filia temporis (truth is the daughter of time) attributed
by a second century Roman grammarian to an unnamed predecessor. “Alius quidam veterum
poetarum, cuius nomen mihi nunc memoriae non est, Veritatem Temporis filiam esse dixit.”
(Another ancient poet, whose name I have forgotten, said that Truth was the daughter of
Time.) Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, XII.11.7.
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In the best of all possible worlds, experienced arbitrators will find ways to meet all
goals with equal robustness. Yet the best of all words frequently eludes us, thus requiring
occasional compromise and concession, a matter to which we shall now turn in greater detail.
B. Four Aspirations
In his novel The Three Musketeers, Alexander Dumas features a trio of brave
comrades who sought to guard their king and serve the queen, all the while living by
the motto “All for one, one for all”. Similarly, the aspirations of a good arbitrator comprise
three core goals: accuracy, fairness and efficiency. Together these duties join in service to a
relatively predictable and neutral dispute resolution process promoting the type of economic
cooperation enhanced by reliable vindication of ex ante expectations.
The first aim of arbitration must be accuracy in the sense of “getting it right” when
determining the facts and applying the law. Award accuracy implicates fidelity to the text of
the contract and the context of the relevant bargain. The arbitrator should aim to get as near
as reasonably possible to an understanding of what actually happened between the litigants
and how the pertinent legal norms apply to the controverted events. 3 Not an absolute truth as
might exist in the mind of an omniscient God; but rather a reasonably correct picture of the
controverted events, words, and norms that affect claims and defenses. The good arbitrator
recognizes that although a perfect understanding of disputed facts often proves elusive, some
answers are more correct than others.

3

That awards are not generally subject to judicial review for inaccuracy per se in no way
diminishes an arbitrator’s duty to seek the right result. Arbitration would be a poor form of
justice if the process aimed only at satisfying minimum standards for judicial annulment. In
modern arbitration law, the limitations on grounds for judicial review (which generally do not
include mistake of law or fact as such) derive from respect for the parties’ bargain to have the
merits of their dispute decided by an arbitrator rather than a judge. See generally, William
W. Park, Explaining Arbitration Law, in DEFINING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 7 (Julio César
Betancourt, ed. 2016).
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Second, the process must be fair. In the context of arbitration, the capacious notion of
“fairness” incorporates several elements: to hear before deciding, often called “due process”
or “natural’ justice” in the Anglo-American legal world, and principe du contradictoire in
Francophone legal systems; to respect the contours of arbitral jurisdiction, whether by reason
of the relevant contract or some public policy constraint; and to remain impartial and
independent. Litigants should expect a decision by arbitrators who avoid pre-judgment,
remain unbiased, and demonstrate respect for the limits of their authority, whether fixed by
contract, statute or treaty.
Thirdly, arbitrators should aim to avoid undue time and cost, with the devil in the
detail surrounding the adjective “undue”. One person’s delay might be another’s due
process. As discussed shortly, the efficiency of an arbitration in the narrow sense (low cost
and high speed) must be evaluated against broader notions of efficiency related to the choice
of procedures appropriate to the case at hand..
Readers of The Three Musketeers will remember that the novel’s three initial heroes
(Athos, Porthos and Aramis) found themselves joined by a fourth comrade named
d’Artagnan, a poor but courageous nobleman from Gascony who hoped to enter the King’s
Guards and fight beside his friends. Likewise, the catalogue of arbitrator duties includes an
additional aspiration: the award should be enforceable.
Enforceability, the “fourth musketeer” of arbitral duties, touches the interaction of
arbitrators and courts, implicating vigilance in promoting an arbitral process that leads to
something more than a mere piece of paper. Prevailing litigants expect arbitrators to avoid
grounds for annulment or non-recognition by judicial authorities called to review the award. 4

4

This duty of enforceability has been underscored in institutional arbitration rules. Article 35
of the ICC Rules provides: “In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the
[ICC] Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall … make every effort to make sure that the Award
is enforceable at law.” Likewise, the LCIA Rules provide in Article 32.2: “In all matters not
5

Award defects which taint enforceability would normally include breach of due process,
excess of authority, and disregard of mandatory legal norms.
Any thoughtful observer will note that these four aspirations of a good arbitrator will
often conflict with one another. Granting an opportunity for more testimony, or additional
document production, might enhance procedural fairness, perhaps also furthering substantive
accuracy by providing the arbitrator supplemental information on which to base a decision.
Yet the potential benefit comes at a cost: delay and extra expense. In turn, any attempt to
economize by denying more testimony or document production could lead to challenge of the
award by the aggrieved party.
When alternatives seem finely balanced, how does an arbitrator proceed? Does a
thumb on the scale tilt for fairness and accuracy, or for efficiency? To these matters we shall
now turn.
II.

Contemplating Alternatives
A. Efficiency from Two Perspectives
In its popular usage, efficiency has come to mean doing things quick and cheap. A

process tends to be perceived as efficient if the expense is low and the speed is high.
In arbitration, this narrow definition sometimes runs counter to broader notions of
efficiency that implicate effective case management. Arbitrators are expected to craft
processes appropriate to the circumstances and proportional to what is at stake. Except for
lawyers with a very bad case, arbitration rarely wins accolades for being effective when the
proceedings go so fast that the arbitrators lack an adequate opportunity to appreciate evidence
and argument. Nor would the prevailing party consider a proceeding efficient if the award
ends up being annulled for lack of due process. By contrast, a fair process will usually be
accepted as legitimate, even by the side receiving the rough side of the award.

expressly provided for in these Rules, the LCIA Court, the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties
shall … make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is legally enforceable.”
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Saving time and money (the narrower sense of efficiency) constitutes a means to an
end, not the goal itself. The ultimate objective of good case management lies in fixing a
process that suits the case. 5 Like the restaurant chef in our opening scenario, arbitrators can
spoil things by acting so rapidly as to serving bad food even if arrives quickly.
Seen in this larger context, the juxtaposition of fairness and efficiency may prove a
false conflict. Fairness requires some measure of efficiency, since justice too long delayed
becomes justice denied. Likewise, without fairness an arbitral proceeding would hardly be
efficient, since it would fail to deliver a key element of the desired product: a sense that
justice had been respected.
A paradigm articulation of this tension presents itself in Section 33(1) of the 1996
English Arbitration Act, which directs arbitrators to: (i) act fairly and impartially as between
the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with
that of his opponent, and (ii) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular
case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution
of the matters falling to be determined. 6
These competing directives provide convenient hooks for counsel to hang procedural
arguments, either for or against applications to bifurcate, to compel disclosure, or to move
deadlines. However, they contain little inherent guidance on how the arbitrator should weigh
competing aims, a nuanced task which generally benefits from an experience level sufficient
to guide the tribunal on shared expectations of fairness in the community of arbitration users.
Promoting an optimum administration of justice often proves to be an art more than a science,
5

In this connection, see generally Fabien Gélinas & Clément Camion, Efficiency and Values
in the Constitution of Civil Procedure, 4 (Issue 2) International Journal of Procedural Law
202 (2014). In both commercial settings and investor-state disputes, serious public interests
are implicated by reliability, in the sense of promoting positive economic cooperation.
6

On the interaction between an arbitrator’s discretion to craft proceedings and the elements
of due process in the context of the 1996 Act, see William W. Park, Two Faces of Progress:
Fairness and Flexibility in Arbitral Procedure, 23 Arb. Int’l 499 (2007).

7

with a delicate counterpoise among aims such as speed, economy, accuracy, fairness and
enforceability.
B. Costs and Benefits
1. The Last Bad Experience
Rightly or wrongly, much current commentary puts the spotlight on efficiency in its
narrow sense, as related to time and cost. Less thought seems to be given to the broader
contexts in which speed and economy can operate to the detriment of due process, accuracy
and enforceability. 7
One reason might be that basic fairness has become a “given” to be assured by the
judicial supervision of curial courts monitoring the integrity of arbitral proceedings at the
time an award receives confirmation or recognition. 8 In addition, the details of each dispute
must be considered when questioning the accuracy of an award or the proportionality of a
procedural measure.
By contrast, complaints about time and cost require less robust analysis. The
confidentiality of proceedings makes it difficult to discuss details about alternative ways to
do things, or the optimum paths to equilibrium among various elements of legitimate
decision-making. Although thoughtful arbitrators make efforts to “square the circle” so as to
7

A 2010 study by the Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group found that 100% of
corporate counsel think arbitration takes too long, and 69% think it costs too much. Lucy
Reed, More on Corporate Criticism of International Arbitration, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (16
July 2010), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com (blaming delays in arbitral proceedings on the
limited availability of top-tier arbitrators and their “excessive concern for due process”).
Another study, co-sponsored by a major law firm and a London university, suggested that
50% of the participating respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of arbitrators in
international arbitration. See 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International
Arbitration, White & Case LLP and School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary,
University of London) (2010). The study follows an earlier survey sponsored by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
8

Some scholars argue that there has been an overreaction to the prospect of award vacatur.
See Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, Due process paranoia and the procedural judgment
rule: a safe harbor for procedural management decisions by international arbitrators, 32
ARBITRATION INT’L 415 (2016).
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reconcile these multiple conflicting goals, the reality of the conflicting tensions often dictates
a result that disappoints the seekers of both curves an right angles.
As in many areas of life, 9 the lodestar for evaluating arbitration often resides in some
recent bad experience that overshadows other more positive incidents. 10 The business
manager who sees her case as wrongly decided will sense grievance that annulment actions
cannot be filed for a simple mistake of fact and law, but lie only for breach of due process or
excess of authority. By contrast, the corporate executive who just prevailed in an arbitration
will likely feel frustrated that the losing side gets any right of court recourse at all, providing
a second bite at the apple even for limited grounds. One lawyer feels aggrieved at failure to
get an order for fuller document production, to obtain the hoped-for “smoking gun” that will
destroy an adversary’s case. By contrast, the recipient of the same discovery order will
complain about the overly generous scope of the order that results in senseless waste of time
and money combing company files.
Complaints about the efficiency of arbitration often follow similar lines. A claimant
will remember that the case did not move as quickly as hoped, failing to recollect that its
lawyers agreed to arbitrate in a country known for interventionist judicial proceedings. A
respondent will complain about the high cost of having to defend against a meritless claim,
forgetting that the proceedings were prolonged because its legal team insisted that without
extensive document production their rights would be prejudiced.

9

The pattern does not limit itself to arbitration. In most supermarket suggestion boxes,
complaints seem to outnumber compliments. Disappointed shoppers unable to find just the
right brand of mustard usually feel more aggrieved, and thus are moved to express
themselves. On the other hand, relatively few customers fill in such forms to express delight
at finding the other 36 items on their shopping list.

10

Many thanks to my friend Jim Carter for introducing this insight, albeit in a slightly
different format.
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2. Hard Choices
a) Contract Drafting
Reacting against bad experience sometimes runs in tandem with forgetfulness about
our own role in making hard choices. Human nature being what it is, some critics of
arbitration (and of arbitrators) forget that time and expense often derive from the very
procedural features the parties adopted in an effort to enhance fairness and accuracy.
With a few keystrokes of the computer, contract drafters could adopt some simple
adjustments to the standard arbitration clause that would substantially reduce the duration of
proceedings and the money spent on legal fees. These changes might (i) provide for one
rather than three arbitrators; (ii) ban document production; (iii) limit the size and number of
briefs; and (iv) stipulate awards without detailed reasoning. The critics of undue time and
cost might also lobby for legislation to eliminate annulment of awards at the arbitral seat,
leaving the only judicial recourse at the place of enforcement itself. 11
Each innovation, however, would carry its own cost, drawing understandable
resistance from large segments of the arbitration community. Three arbitrators make for a
more rigorous process, as do comprehensive written reasons explaining the legal and factual
underpinnings of a decision. 12 Document production reduces the possibility of an unjust
result by enhancing the prospect that arbitrators will receive a fuller record, including
previously undisclosed letter or emails unfavorable to one side’s position. Thorough
memorials enhance rigorous analysis. And the right to challenge a defective award where
rendered presents the paradigm example of competing costs and benefits. A motion to vacate
might add expense just after the award has been made; but even more money may be needed

11

The late Professor Fouchard (among others) proposed such legislation two decades ago.
See generally Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de l'annulation de la sentence
arbitrale dans son pays d'origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329.
12

More than once, arbitrators have found that initial conclusions “just won’t write” during
the award drafting exercise.
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to challenge a procedurally defective award in multiple enforcement actions around the
world.
The chief downside of any over-simplification lies in the risk of diverting attention
and thoughtful reflection from genuine quandaries that reside in the many procedural choices
which implicate finely balanced costs and benefits. To bring the debate back to what actually
goes on in real-life proceedings, it may be helpful to consider some of the common questions
that resist facile analysis and blanket responses.
b) A Laundry List of Dilemmas
The situations listed below exemplify some of the dilemmas facing arbitrators in
complex cases. Although perfect answers may prove elusive, some solutions will be better
than others in accommodating efficiency and fairness.
•

Document production. A request for information exchange implicates time, money,
and energy. However, losing the case by reason of not getting a key exhibit can be
much worse. The arbitrator’s dilemma lies in making decisions about relevancy and
materiality before a case is fully understood.

•

Reconsideration. Following a decision on document production, a dissatisfied party
may seek reconsideration and ask for additional material to be disclosed. An
automatic refusal to consider the request may result in injustice. Considering the
application will in any event require time. If the motion is found to have merit, an
order is made to produce additional documents, deadlines may need to be adjusted to
take into account the time for one side to produce more documents and for the other
side to study the material before the next submission. The addition of days given to
the requesting party will likely trigger a call for “equal time” by the other side,
sometimes putting hearing schedules in jeopardy.

•

Bias. Challenges for arbitrator bias prove disruptive to timetables. Yet even less
attractive would be a system with no mechanism to monitor the arbitrator’s
impartiality and independence.

•

Hidden financiers. Concern about arbitrator conflict may lead to requests for
disclosure of third-party funders. Addressing the request will take time, and may
meet the objection, “What you don’t know can’t hurt you.” Denying the application
has its own costs. If it transpires that an arbitrator had links with the person paying
bills for the prevailing party, the integrity of the process (if not the validity of the
award) would doubtlessly be called into question, regardless of what the arbitrator
actually knew at the time.

•

Bifurcation. Deciding an issue on a preliminary basis (whether related to jurisdiction
or liability) can add time and cost. However, a system would be quite unattractive if

11

respondents were always forced to engage high-priced experts to present testimony
before arbitrators who clearly lack authority, or where no breach of contract had
occurred. The appropriateness of bifurcating some questions depends on a factspecific analysis, implicating factors that include whether one question will remain so
intertwined with another as to make a separate hearing duplicative. Analogous
concerns arise with respect to summary judgments (dispositive motions) on questions
that can be decided without an evidentiary hearing.
c) Institutional Rules
Arbitral institutions often join the chorus of characterizing time and cost as enemies.
Yet most institutions recognize the trade-offs inherent in speed and economy. The ICC
Rules, for example, require arbitrators “to conduct the arbitration in the expeditious and costeffective manner” 13 while at the same time imposing at least two additional stages of
arbitration: signing of Terms of Reference and scrutiny of an award by the ICC Secretariat. 14
Most institutional rules impose reasoned awards (which can enhance both rigor and
transparency) notwithstanding the time taken to provide explanations of a decision when
three arbitrators might disagree on the reasoning even if not on the result.
The International Chamber of Commerce requires “Terms of Reference” on the
assumption that an early effort to refine the claims and counterclaims will assist the arbitral
process. Yet in many cases, the need to draft such Terms blocks a case from proceeding
without time-consuming administrative steps. 15
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules require a final award within six months
from referral of the dispute to the arbitral tribunal, presumably to foster efficiency, even
though this deadline normally proves quite out of the question for “big ticket” cases raising
13

Article 22(1) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration.

14

Articles 23(1) and 33 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration.

15

Although an outright refusal of a party to sign the Terms of Reference would lead the ICC
to step in and approve the Terms, the delay may be due not to any refusal to participate, but
because one side misunderstands the process, or because the ICC differs from the arbitral
tribunal on what should be included in the Terms. Article 23(3) of the ICC Rules provides,
“If any of the parties refuses to take part in the drawing up of the Terms of Reference or to
sign the same, they shall be submitted to the Court for approval. When the Terms of
Reference have been signed … or approved by the Court, the arbitration shall proceed.”
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complex legal and factual questions. 16 Still the SCC routinely requires the arbitral tribunal
and counsel to make a reasoned award for an extension, even when the deadline falls before
presentation of evidence or argument.
Some institutions require arbitral awards to be witnessed or notarized. At the same
time, from a concern about award enforceability, the institution will deny a three-member
tribunal the right to execute an award in counterparts. The result may be an unattainable and
contradictory effort to produce an electronic copy of an award for purposes of speed (to meet
an enforcement deadline) while at the same time insisting that all three arbitrators execute the
same signature page with the same witnesses or notarizations.
III.

The Enforcement Stage
A. The Law of Arbitration
Arbitral awards do not normally become unenforceable simply because they are

wrong, or because the process has been long and costly. 17 However, award annulment or
non-recognition could be the destiny of an arbitrator’s decision reached through proceedings
that constituted a serious departure from fundamental rules of basic procedural fairness. 18
In most modern legal systems, the law of arbitration (as distinct from the specific
legal rules applied to decide a particular dispute) comprises statutes, cases and treaties to
guide the interaction between arbitrators who decide cases and judges who review awards. 19
This legal structure includes two distinct limbs. First, parties should be held to their bargains

16

Article 37 of the SCC Arbitration Rules.

17

See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act § 10; Article 1520 of the French Code de procédure
civile; Article 52 of the ICSID Convention of 1965.
18

Indirectly of course, sanctions for violation of due process will promote accuracy, by
encouraging arbitrators to listen to both sides before deciding, thus augmenting the
information available to the decision-making process.
19

International disputes usually implicates more than one jurisdiction and therefore require
thoughtful arbitrators to take into account several sets of arbitration laws. In particular,
arbitrators may need to reconcile arbitration regimes of the seat of arbitration with the
arbitration laws of a country where award’s enforcement will be sought.
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to arbitrate. Second, the courts and institutions which enforce the commitment to arbitrate
must also monitor the basic integrity of the arbitral process, so as to enhance the prospect that
cases will be heard by fair individuals who listen before deciding, stay within their mission,
and respect the limits of relevant public policy.
A certain irony exists in penalties for breach of an arbitrator’s duty to provide fair
hearings. The sanction of award annulment falls not so much on the arbitrator who breached
his duty, 20 but rather on the prevailing party which must suffer annulment of an award that
implicated a breach of procedural integrity.
B. The Arbitral Seat: Conflict in Action
The arena of judicial review, in France and in England, provides an opportunity to
explore some of the tensions among different duties of an arbitrator. As illustrated below,
deciding quickly and cheaply can sometimes run afoul of due process; and fidelity to the
parties’ contract can occasionally conflict with mandatory norms of an enforcement action.
1. New Theories and Due Process
In each of the cases discussed below, experienced tribunals sitting in France rendered
thoughtful awards that were later vacated because the efficiency of their proceedings failed to
provide adequate opportunity for counsel to comment on relevant legal theories.
a) Caribbean Niquel
In 2010, the Paris Cour d’appel decided the case of Caribbean Niquel v. Overseas
Mining, 21 which implicated the parties’ rights to address new legal theories in a context that
pitted the aim of efficiency against the goal of due process. After a Cuban mining venture
had gone sour, arbitrators sitting in Paris awarded the claimant US$45 million on a theory of
20

Even if they may suffer loss of reputation, offending arbitrators can benefit from immunity
notwithstanding having violated their duty of basic procedural integrity. In one case, a sole
arbitrator failed to disclose a romantic relationship with the sister of respondent’s counsel.
Immunity was upheld even though the award had been vacated. See La Serena Properties v.
Weisbach, 186 Cal. App. 4th 893, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
21

La Société Commercial Caribbean Niquel v. La Société Overseas Mining Investments Ltd.,
Paris Court of Appeals, 1st Chamber, 08/23901, 25 March 2010.
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“lost chance” (la perte de chance), even though the parties had argued a theory of quantum
based on lost profits (le gain manqué). One can well imagine that arbitrators would not find
it satisfying to apply a “lost profits” theory with respect to a mine that had not yet become
operative. 22
The Cour d’appel vacated the award for violation of provisions in the Code de
procédure civile related to the right to be heard (principe de la contradiction 23) and
procedural public policy (ordre public procédural). 24 Although not questioning the
assumption that arbitrators know the law (often expressed as jura novit curia) the French
court found it unacceptable that an award should rest on a method of damages calculation that
counsel had not had an adequate opportunity to address.
The decision carries its own problems, providing a stark example of the difficulty
faced by arbitrators seeking to balance their various duties, with each alternative likely to
spring its own special trap. Imagine that the arbitrators in Caribbean Niquel, in the midst of
their deliberations, had re-opened the proceedings to set a briefing schedule on the new legal
theory of lost chance. There would have been moaning all around about added expense and
delay.
Had the tribunal raised with counsel the new theory earlier, the tribunal might have
been perceived as lacking even-handedness. The respondent could have said, with some
22

Indeed, the tribunal held that calculating the lost economic benefit was too uncertain,
whereas calculating the value of the chance to take advantage of an economic opportunity
could “undeniably” be evaluated. The tribunal therefore based the reasoning in its award on
the legal theory that the party should be compensated for the economic value of the lost
opportunity.
23

The oft-used term “principe du contradictoire” has been memorialized in the Code de
procédure civile as the “principe de la contradiction”.
24

As in force at the time of the Cour d’appel decision, these provisions were contained in
Article 1502 of the Code de procédure civile, which provided inter alia as follows: “L’appel
de la décision qui accorde la reconnaissance ou l’exécution n’est ouvert que dans les cas
suivants:
4° Lorsque le principe de la contradiction n’a pas été respecté; 5° Si la
reconnaissance ou l’exécution sont contraires à l’ordre public international.” A 2011 decree
moved these two clauses to Article 1520 of the state statute, albeit with the same formulation.

15

justification: “You arbitrators are acting as advocates, signaling that claimant’s chances of
success will increase with a pleading amended to include new damages theories.”
Finally, it would have been equally problematic for the arbitrators to decide the case
without consideration of the “lost chance” measure of damages. The tribunal would face the
unattractive choice between granting an award simply for lost profits, yielding an incorrect
amount, or denying recovery entirely, which would have penalized an otherwise meritorious
claim.
An arbitrator’s attempt to improve proceedings from one perspective can make things
worse from another angle. Enhancing efficiency can reduce fairness and accuracy. To
complicate matters further, the concepts of fairness, accuracy, efficiency and enforceability
are not monolithic. Each notion includes multiple obligations. Tensions thus exist not only
among those four goals, but also within each of the various distinct yet related duties which
in practice often compete one with another. As noted, suggesting to counsel an opportunity
to address a new legal theory promotes the parties’ right to be heard, but perhaps at the
expense of exposing arbitrators to a charge of being biased.
b) De Sutter v. Madagascar
The tensions within the set of duties guiding arbitrator comportment presented
themselves again in France a half-dozen years later, following an award rendered pursuant to
the bilateral investment treaty between the Republic of Madagascar and the Belgium–
Luxembourg Economic Union. In De Sutter et al. v. Madagascar, an ICC award had been
rendered in favor of Belgian textile manufacturers that had suffered damage due to labor
strike at the factory, which as it happened accompanied a coup d’état in Madagascar. 25

25

Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 16 Mars 2016, Pole 1 – Chambre 1, RG 14/ 19164. The
underlying award had been rendered under the ICC Rules (as permitted by the treaty) by an
eminent Paris-based American arbitrator.
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When a Madagascar insurer refused to reimburse the investors for the damage, a
lower court in Madagascar rendered a judgment in in favor of the Belgian investor, finding
the loss covered by the policy as having originated from labor unrest rather than riot of a
political nature. Later, the execution of that decision was suspended by Madagascan
authorities, triggering the arbitration under the investment treaty, which permitted selection
of the ICC Rules to govern the procedure.
According to the sole arbitrator, the Madagascan court’s decision to suspend
execution of the judgment’s execution derived not from the interests of justice, according to
applicable law, but because the insurance company was owned by the Madagascar
government. Consequently, the treaty had been breached in respect of its third Article,
including inter alia the duty to accord fair and equitable treatment to investors. So far, so
good.
As in Caribbean Niquel, the difficulty came in the way the arbitrator characterized
damages. The request for capital and interest (the amount granted by the Madagascar court)
had been rejected by the arbitrator as outside treaty coverage, given that the underlying
claims were still pending and thus precluding expropriation as such.
Under the circumstances, however, the arbitrator ordered payment of an amount equal
to interest (at the legal rate in Madagascar) running from the date of the 2012 local court
judgment through June 2014, shortly before the award was issued. The arbitrator determined
this amount as fair compensation for gain to which claimant had been entitled but was unable
to enjoy (“bénéfice dont PGM n’a pu profiter”) due to the suspension.
The Paris Cour d’appel vacated the award pursuant to Article 1520(4) of the French
Code de procédure civile which as mentioned earlier addresses breach of the right to be
heard, referred to as principe de la contradiction in the French text. Through a multitude of
those clauses which provide such difficult reading for common law jurists, each introduced
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by the rhetorical device considérant que (“considering that”), the Court seemed to reason that
the arbitrator could not, without inviting comment by counsel, substitute an amount of
damages during the period of suspension in Madagascar for the sum actually requested by the
claimants. 26
Contrary to what William Shakespeare suggested about a rose by any other name
smelling as sweet, 27 allocation of the interest under a different label (in substance taken from
the claimants’ original request) was deemed unsatisfactory to the reviewing French court.
The case underscores the frequent overlap between a simple mistake (normally unreviewable
under modern arbitration statutes) and matters of due process, with the latter (like excess of
authority) remaining grounds for annulment.
2. Cost Allocation and Contract Terms
To explore how one set of arbitral duties may collide with another, few examples
serve better than the norms for cost allocation in England, which in some instances prove at
odds with fidelity to the parties’ agreement, as well as the requirements for award
enforcement in other fora.
The 1996 English Arbitration Act invalidates pre-dispute agreements to allocate
arbitration costs “in any event”. 28 In advance of the dispute, parties may not by contract
forbid an arbitrator from taking into account who won and who lost when allocating costs. 29

26

The total amount requested by claimant initially had come to approximately €5.8 million,
while the interest element (characterized as “bénéfice” in the award) came to €691 thousand.
27

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene 2.

28

Section 60, Arbitration Act of 1996: “An agreement which has the effect that a party is to
pay the whole or part of the costs of the arbitration in any event is only valid if made after the
dispute in question has arisen.” Section 61 goes on to set forth the general principle that
“costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the
circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs”. This
standard, however, is made subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise, which in context with
Section 60 would be an agreement after the dispute has arisen.
29

To be clear, the statute does not impose the English “costs follow the event” rule in all
events, but simply invalidates pre-dispute attempts to eliminate the arbitrator’s discretion to
18

The provision casts a wide net, serving not only as an anti-abuse mechanism to prevent ‘youpay-in-any-event’ clauses from discouraging claims by weaker parties, but also catches
otherwise reasonable arrangements among sophisticated business managers.
Promoting award enforceability by complying with English law remains a
problematic proposition in an international case. Consider what an arbitrator should do in the
following situation.
The parties have decided to arbitrate in England, but also subjected their contract to
the law of New York. The contract contains an explicit provision that in any arbitration the
two sides will split arbitrator compensation on a 50/50 basis. Even more significant from a
financial perspective, the agreement says each side covers its own arbitration-related legal
expenses.
Flouting clear contract language on cost allocation would comply with English law. 30
However, to disregard the contract, which requires each side to bear its own expenses, might
well (and not unreasonably) appear as an excess of authority to a New York court called to
enforce an award costs. Disregard of contract terms would also be less than appealing from
the perspective of accurate implementation of the parties’ agreement. 31

consider who won and who lost in fixing obligations for items such as attorneys’ fees and
amounts paid to the arbitrators and the arbitral institution.
30

Presumably, Section 68 of the 1996 Act (“serious irregularity causing substantial
injustice”) permits judicial action to correct an arbitrator’s failure to respect Section 60.
31

A landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court implicated a similar dilemma, albeit with
respect to substantive norms rather than procedure. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). An agreement involving a Japanese auto manufacturer and
an American dealer provided for application of Swiss law by arbitrators in Japan, a choice
explained by the existence of a Swiss affiliate of a joint venture company in the distribution
chain. Ordering arbitration, the Court warned that American antitrust law must be considered
in connection with any counterclaim, despite the contractual choice-of-law clause.
Mitsubishi footnote 19 suggests a ‘prospective waiver’ doctrine that would invalidate choiceof-law agreements that operated to waive a right to pursue American remedies. Moreover,
the so-called “second look” doctrine in Mitsubishi warned that American courts would
exercise their power at the award enforcement stage to “ensure that the legitimate interest in
the enforcement of the antitrust laws [of the United States] had been addressed”.
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What is a conscientious arbitrator to do? Remain faithful to the parties’ agreement?
Respect the procedural law at the arbitral seat? Or look to the laws to be applied by the
enforcement court in New York? Occasionally, nuanced approaches to award may provide
an exit from this particular quandary. However, the dilemma demonstrates again how the
achievement of counterpoise among rival goals remains an enduring challenge of arbitration
policy and practice.
IV.

Good Practices
In arbitration, the elusiveness of counterpoise among rival goals should not be

surprising. Vigorous discussion also exists on the optimum way to conduct court
proceedings, both on a comparative level (considering different national systems) and as
between positions taken by different scholarly camps and judicial circuits in a single country.
To take an illustration, arbitrators often struggle with the wisdom of granting
“dispositive motions” (equivalent to “summary judgment” in some legal systems) dismissing
a claim at the outset of an arbitration pursuant to a preliminary ruling, without full
consideration of testimony. 32 Such applications may be permitted pursuant to the express or
implied terms of institutional rules, 33and on occasion pursuant to the terms of the parties’
agreement. 34

32

See e.g., Bucheit Int’l Ltd. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp (OPIC), AAA Case No. 50T 195
00361 03 (2004), with a summary judgment motion granted under AAA Commercial Rules
Article 30(b). See Robert O’Sullivan, “Motion Practice in Arbitration”, in International
Commercial Dispute Resolution, 39 INT’L LAWYER 235, at 239–41 (Mark A. Garfinkel ed.
2005). See also James H. Carter, Dispositive Motions in International Arbitration and the
Role of U.S. Court, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 39 (24th
Sokol Colloquium, Univ. Virginia, ed. J.N. Moore 2013).
33

See e.g., AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, Article 30(b), providing that an arbitrator,
exercising his or her discretion [may] direct the parties to focus their presentations on issues
the decision of which could dispose of all or part of the case. Compare 2012 ICC Arbitration
Rules providing that “in order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after
consulting the parties, may adopt such procedural measures as it considers appropriate,
provided that they are not contrary to any agreement of the parties.” See also 2014 LCIA
Rules Article 14.4 a duty to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration,
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The appropriateness of ending the arbitration before a full hearing will depend on the
factual configuration of the case. 35 In some instances, the equivalent of a summary
judgment rule in arbitration may have unintended consequences, adding rather than reducing
cost. 36
In national court proceedings, analogous questions arise about when to allow claims
to be dismissed early in the proceedings. The questions usually work themselves out in
connection with broader policy discussions by legislatures or courts about litigation costs and

avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair, efficient and expeditious
means for the final resolution of the parties' dispute.
34

See decision Travis Coal Restructuring Holdings LLC v Essar Global Fund Limited,
[2014] EWHC 2510 (Comm), involving an application to enforce in London an award made
in New York, opposed in part on the grounds that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority
in making an award pursuant to a request for summary judgment. The opinion by Mr. Justice
Blair noted inter alia that the relevant contract provided that “the arbitrators shall have the
discretion to hear and determine at any stage of the arbitration any issue asserted by any party
to be dispositive of any claim or counterclaim, in whole or part, in accordance with such
procedure as the arbitrators may deem appropriate, and the arbitrators may render an award
on such issue.”
35

In Travis Coal (infra), the court went into detail on the facts of the dispute, which
implicated a complicated share purchase transaction, with a guarantee of the sale purchase
price contained an ICC arbitration clause providing for proceedings seated in New York.
After failure to make payments, an arbitral tribunal issued an award in favor of the
beneficiary of the guarantee. Although ultimately adjourning the enforcement action
pending resolution of an annulment motion before courts in New York, the learned judge
expressed serious doubts about success of the application to vacate. He noted that in fact the
arbitral tribunal had moved beyond a simple summary judgment process, and actually heard
testimony on key questions of fraud. The court also emphasized the context of the case,
citing the award, “As a commercial center, New York is even more rigorous in expecting that
parties that have given a written guarantee of performance – in which they waive certain
defenses and disclaim certain subjects of reliance – will promptly honor their commitments”
36

In 2006 the ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended to add provision for a preliminary
objection that a claim is “manifestly without legal merit”. Doubtlessly intended to make
proceedings more efficient by allowing a hopeless case to be put to rest early, some observers
express concern that the rule encourages Respondent’s to file such complaints as a matter of
course, inserting an unnecessary procedural step. Article 41(5), ICSID Arbitration Rules.
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social justice. Some legal systems authorize summary judgment for specific types of
transactions, particularly with respect to financial instruments. 37
The stakes may differ as between judicial and arbitral proceedings, since court
judgments remain appealable on the substantive merits of the decision, while arbitration
awards normally do not. Thus the results of “getting it wrong” may prove more dramatic for
an arbitrator’s decision than for that of a judge.
In some legal systems, deeper social and economic issues work themselves into what
at first blush appear to be relatively formalistic pleading requirements, particularly with
respect to rules on dismissal of complaints for failure to state a claim. Standards have
fluctuated with respect to rival concern about litigation expense, on the one hand, and access
to justice, on the other.
Liberal federal practice in the United States long allowed “notice pleading” under
which courts allowed an action to proceed as long as the trial judge could construe a
complaint to state some semblance of a case. 38 Later, experience with the high cost of
discovery led the U.S. Supreme Court to raise the bar by interpreting the law to require
enough facts to state a claim to relief “plausible on its face.” 39 The approach was later

37

See e.g., French Nouveau code de procédure civile (NCPC), Art. 1405 (2) (formerly Code
de commerce , Art. 641), granting French courts the power to issue a payment order
(injonction de payer) with respect to promissory notes and other negotiable instruments.
8 For an analysis of factors that explain
38

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need include only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”. The
U.S. Supreme Court once construed this rule to preclude complaints from being dismissed
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

39

Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) involved a putative class action for
alleged market allocation by cable companies in violation of American competition law. The
mere fact of competitors acting in the same fashion (“conscious parallelism”) would normally
be insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Sherman Act. Some “plus factor” must
indicate an anti-competitive agreement. In Twombly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held the complaint could not be dismissed unless “no set of facts” would permit plaintiffs to
demonstrate collusion rather than coincidence. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing
22

refined to require courts in essence to apply their experience to screen out weak claims, a task
that sometimes carries political overtones. 40
Whether conducted by courts or by arbitrators, decisions on dispositive applications
and motions to dismiss claims will usually elude “black letter” rules. Instead, such measures
put a premium on understanding the nuances of how procedural principles interact with rival
concerns about cost and justice.
V.

Counterpoise and Common Sense
An oft-quoted line from the philosopher Francis Bacon suggests, “If a man will begin

with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall
end in certainties.” 41 Careful observers will note how the proposition proves overbroad in
both its limbs. Some individuals end their intellectual pilgrimages as self-assured as they
began, while others retain doubts all along the way. 42
Despite its extravagant nature, the aphorism points to the rewards of a healthy
humility (close cousin of doubt), which in arbitration as elsewhere often enhances sound

concerns about litigation expense which required a pleading of enough facts to state a claim
that is “plausible on its face.”
40

Twombly was followed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2008), where a detainee’s
complaint was dismissed for failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful
discrimination. A Pakistani Muslim claimed mistreatment while held for terrorist
connections after improperly obtaining a Social Security number. Following release, the
detainee alleged racial and religious bias by the FBI Director and former U.S. Attorney
General, seeking relief for violations of various Constitutional rights. In a 5-4 decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision refusing to dismiss the claim. The Court
found a plausible explanation for the detention, other than purposeful targeting of Arabs and
Muslims. According to the Supreme Court majority, a non-discriminatory aim to detain
illegal aliens with terrorist connections might, in the post-9/11 world, produce a disparate but
incidental impact on Arabs and Muslim. This alternative explanation meant that the
complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful discrimination.
41

Francis Bacon, OF THE PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, DIVINE AND
HUMAN (1605). The careful reader will note the shift from “will” to “shall” in each half of
the sentence, perhaps suggesting that wilful insistence on being right ultimately leads to selfdoubt, while an intentional openness to ideas yields confidence in the end.
42

Some people seem to finish their intellectual pilgrimage as self-assured as they start, while
others remain invariably confused by doubts, with little progress along the way.
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analysis. In the real-life drama of arbitration, tensions among legitimate adjudicatory aims
often resist facile resolution. While some solutions may be better than others (and some
doubtless worse), finding an optimum path often proves easier after acknowledging that no
trail will be perfect. Usually it proves healthier to speak of “good ways” to do things, rather
than to assert “best practices” commending themselves across the board.

Hearing additional testimony may enhance fairness at the expense of speed and
economy. An arbitrator’s suggestion that counsel consider a new legal theory might promote
an accurate result, but at the risk of creating perceptions of arbitrator bias. Willingness to
reconsider discovery rulings could yield helpful documents, while at the same disrupting a
delicate briefing timetable and jeopardizing hearing dates.
Beginning with too much certainty about procedural questions, some arbitrators (like
some scholars, judges, lawyers and list-serve pundits) may later find themselves blindsided
by facts indicating a different direction of analysis. An affirmation that some conclusion
“surely must be the case” can add rhetorical punch, but at the cost of producing an astigmatic
vision of costs and benefits. Particularly in international arbitration, more than one path may
prove useful to resolve a procedural dilemma.
In some instances, one course of conduct commends itself over alternatives. In other
cases, rivalry among various goals may prove more troublesome, with competing options
neither better nor worse than one another, just different. Compromise and open-mindedness,
more than dogma or ideology, usually remain the touchstone for sound counterpoise among
aspirations to accuracy, fairness, efficiency and enforceability, 43 with good judgment rather
than cleverness proving the hallmark of an effective arbitrator.

43

For perspectives with an alternative emphasis, see RICHARD WEISBERG, IN PRAISE OF
INTRANSIGENCE: PERILS OF FLEXIBILITY (2014); William W. Park Arbitration’s Protean
Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion (2002 Freshfields Lecture), 19 ARB.
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INT’L 279 (2003). As in so many questions, arguments often turn on examples and contexts
considered.
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